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Abstract
Consumers￿choice set of products within stores can be limited. Acker-
berg and Rysman (2005) address this problem by modeling unobserved
consumer preferences over products and retail stores, leading to aug-
mented demand speci￿cations. Having Carbonated Soft Drink product
level data, where we observe products￿store coverage, we are able to esti-
mate their logit, nested logit and random coe¢ cient logit speci￿cations of
demand in a structural model of equilibrium. Allowing for store coverage
turns out to have a very signi￿cant impact on the estimated structural
parameters and on the predictive power of the model. Taking these esti-
mated structural parameters we perform a counterfactual whereby stores
carry all products in the market. We ￿nd systematic increases in price
elasticities and welfare in our new equilibrium. Competition in markets is
more curtailed than normally assumed in structural models of industries.
Keywords: Carbonated Soft Drinks, di⁄erentiated products, discrete
choice, store coverage, structural model, price elasticities, welfare.
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11 Introduction
The ability to estimate demand systems for di⁄erentiated products has become
a core part of New Empirical Industrial Organization.1 Theoretical innovations
allow us to estimate demand for di⁄erentiated products at the product rather
than at the consumer level. This is done by embedding a certain structure into
consumer utility, such as the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in consumer
taste for products around mean utilities using standard logit errors. Utilizing
data on prices, market shares and product characteristics (observable and un-
observable to the econometrician), logit and nested logit discrete-choice models
can be evaluated using the methodology of Berry (1994). In addition, if data on
individual characteristics (observable and unobservable to the econometrician)
is accounted for, random coe¢ cients, as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
and Nevo (2001), can be estimated.
However, as noted by Ackerberg and Rysman (2005), one should worry about
the properties of the commonly used standard logit errors, since these can ad-
versely a⁄ect substitution patterns and welfare outcomes. Logit errors assume
the dimension of unobservable characteristic space to expand proportionally to
the number of products. This may not be realistic for a consumer in a store,
since stores do not tend to carry all available products in the market. This
is con￿rmed by Pakes (2003), who shows that computer retailers typically dis-
play only a subset of the total number of computer models available. Thus,
one important source of unobserved consumer taste heterogeneity is induced
by product availability inside stores.2 Yet, most empirical estimations of de-
mand systems for di⁄erentiated products do not allow heterogenous availability
of products to enter consumer utility.
Another property of standard logit errors is that all products are equidistant
from each other in unobserved characteristic space, when in reality consumer
distance to products, due to store coverage, is expected to be idiosyncratic.3
We address both of these issues in this paper.
Following Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) we adjust logit errors to re￿ ect
1See Ackeberg et al. (2007), and Perlo⁄ et al. (2007) for a good literature review.
2Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) list many examples where one can see cross-sectional vari-
ation in the number of available products in the data [Berry and Waldfogel (1999), Crawford
(2000), Arcidiacono (2005), and Rysman (2004)], or time series variation [Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995), Bresnahan, Stern, and Trajtenberg (1997), Petrin (2002), and Crawford
and Shum (2005)]. Nevo (2001), and Town and Liu (2003) deal with both.
3This would not be true in familiar theoretical location games such as the linear city
of Hotelling (1929) and D￿ Aspremont et al. (1979), or the circular city of Salop (1979).
Heterogeneity in consumer tastes (transportation costs) can be modelled empirically, see Davis
(2006).
2possible product congestion in stores, i.e. products competing for limited avail-
able shelf space, by allowing di⁄erent indirect utility speci￿cations to represent
idiosyncratic unobserved consumer preferences over both retail stores and prod-
ucts.4 We use scanner data on 157 products in retail Carbonated Soft Drinks
(CSD) over 28 bimonthly periods where retail store coverage is observed at the
product level, to estimate their derived logit, nested logit and random coe¢ -
cients logit speci￿cations in a structural model of equilibrium.
As Ackerberg and Rysman￿ s (2005) Monte Carlo study shows, not allowing
for congestion in stores can lead to biases in estimates of price elasticities, as well
as inaccurate welfare e⁄ects. Our analysis based on observable retail product
coverage, will provide us with the true structural parameters and will lead to
more realistic outcomes in terms of price elasticities and welfare than assuming
standard logit errors. Allowing for store coverage at the product level is shown
to have the predicted signi￿cant impact on our jointly estimated demand and
cost systems.
To understand the bias created by standard logit errors, and to further
link our results to Ackerberg and Rysman (2005), we impose full-coverage (no
congestion) in our structural model of equilibrium and evaluate its e⁄ect on price
elasticities and welfare. This counterfactual exercise highlights the potential
distortions that could arise from assuming standard logit errors when congestion
inside stores is actually a feature of consumer choice. All else equal, markets
are found to be more competitive by design when one uses standard logit errors
as the building block to allow for aggregation over unobserved heterogeneity in
consumer taste at the product level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes our
data and discusses the Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) proxies for store coverage.
Section 3 describes our three demand speci￿cations and a supply side model.
It also outlines our counterfactual and derives consumer welfare for the three
speci￿cations. Section 4 outlines our estimations and presents our empirical
results. We make our conclusions in section 5.
4Another approach, advocated by Berry and Pakes (2007), Bajari and Benkard (2005), and
Song (2007), would be to eliminate idiosyncratic logit errors from the model. The Ackerberg
and Rysman (2005) approach is to keep logit errors in the model but allow them to be more
￿exible. The ￿exible logit error imposes no additional computational burden but does require
more product level data such as store coverage. As we will see, using a proxy based on the
number of products may not be of much bene￿t.
32 Data
AC Nielsen collated a panel database of all CSD products distributed throughout
12;000 Irish retail stores. The database provides 28 bimonthly periods spanning
October 1992 to March 1997 for 157 products (brands), identi￿ed for 13 ￿rms
and 40 product characteristics within the particular business of retail CSD. The
data record the retail activities of both Irish and foreign owned products/￿rms
selling throughout stores in the Irish retail sector.
The retail market for Carbonated Soft Drinks in Ireland is broadly similar in
structure to that of the US. In 1997, the top two ￿rms collectively account for 73
per cent of the Irish market and 75 per cent of the US retail market. Inequality
in retail sales, as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient, was 0:72 in Ireland and 0:68
in the US. Like the US the Irish market is heavily branded. There are di⁄erences
between Ireland and the US that are typical of European CSD markets. These
di⁄erences are highlighted in case studies of several countries in Sutton (1991).
We have product level information on:
￿ Product characteristics such as, ￿ avors (Cola, Orange, Lemonade and
Mixed Fruit), packaging types (Cans, Standard Bottle, 1:5 Liter, 2 Liter
and Multi-Pack of Cans) and sweeteners (Diet and Regular).5
Allowing for ￿ avor segments (Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit)
is standard in the analysis of CSD, (Sutton, 1991). To understand why
packaging format is recognized as a crucial feature of this market, we
graph the seasonal cycles of CSD sales by packaging type in Figure 1. The
industry has introduced di⁄erent packaging to satisfy di⁄erent consumer
needs (Walsh and Whelan, 1999). For example, cans peak in the summer
months of June and July, when the weather is warmer. In contrast, 2
Liter bottle sales peak over the winter months of December and January,
the festive season. Packaging by time dummies will be an important way
to control for the impact of weather variations on the sales of segments
de￿ned by packaging. In the cost function, packaging by time dummies
will control for plastic (2-Liter), glass (standard) and aluminium (cans)
input costs that can change over-time.
￿ Price in Irish pounds per liter (weighted average of individual product
5The number of product characteristics was very stable throughout the period of this study.
We take the emergence of such segments as an outcome of history. If in CSD consumers were
fully mobile across segments and advertising was very e⁄ective, the market would evolve to be
dominated by one segment. Taste structures and advertising outlays, amongst other factors,
have driven the current day segmentation of the market by product attribute, see Sutton
(1998).
4prices across all stores selling the product, weighted by product sales share
within stores).6
￿ Quantity sold (in thousands of liters).
￿ Sales value (in thousands of Irish pounds).
Details on the number of products, number of ￿rms, prices, unit sales, and
revenue shares by product segments are outlined in Table 1. We note that
unit sales and revenue shares can be very di⁄erent when one compares
Cans to 2-Liters, for example.
￿ Inventory stocks (forward and back room) represent time to stock-out
(expressed in months) of product sales for the bimonthly period. Table 2
details inventory levels by segments and time, averaged over products. A
demand side interpretation would be that inventories re￿ ect unanticipated
slumps in demand. A supply side view is that inventories are a way of
managing delivery costs.7 We see clearly that segments depending more
on large numbers of impulse buys/small stores (indicated by the cans and
standard packaging format), use inventories more. Here, delivery costs are
clearly higher and can be reduced with the use of inventories. The use of
inventories is pretty stable over time and stock outs are not a feature of
the data.
￿ Store coverage based on counts of stores that the product is in, weighted by
store size in terms of overall CSD turnover. Table 2 also documents store
coverage averaged over products within segments over time, and clearly
shows that it varies over both time and segment.8
Ackerberg and Rysman (2005), AR henceforth, do model unobserved con-
sumer preferences over products by retail stores. Due to data unavailability,
they resort to proxies of coverage. In creating the proxies the authors assume
6The average exchange rate over the period 1992-1997 is approximately 1.6 US dollar to
one Irish pound.
7We refer to Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996) for a theoretical aside on inventory models.
8The structure of the market has large companies placing products across most segments
with varying coverage of stores inside segments depending on the product. Small companies
can specialize in segments with a store type focus. The two large companies tend to face
competition from di⁄erent small independents within each segment. In each segment market
size to sunk cost and the nature of price and non-price competition seem to limit the number
of ￿rms that can operate [see Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003)]. The number of ￿rms
that operate in each segment is quite small. Yet, due to certain local taste characteristics,
particularly in Orange and Mixed Fruit, small companies can ￿ll a quality window and survive
alongside large companies.
5products equally cover a certain number of the total outlets so that, within a






; j = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;J;
where R indicates the total number of stores and J the total number of products
marketed. They propose the following proxies for store coverage, written as a
function of the total number of marketed products:
i) RAR
J = [￿1=J + (1 ￿ ￿1)]
ii) RAR
J = J￿2;
In speci￿cation (i) a value of ￿1 approaching zero is indicative of what they
call a ￿standard logit model￿ , i.e. the introduction of new products in the
market is mirrored directly in new stores. This is as if the product dimension
and the store dimension are able to track each other. On the other hand, a value
of ￿1 approaching one has an opposite e⁄ect that they name ￿pure congestion￿ .
That is, new products have to compete for outlets with the existing products,
thus providing a complete ￿crowding out￿e⁄ect. In speci￿cation (ii) we have
￿pure congestion￿if the parameter ￿2 approaches minus one, and the ￿standard
logit model￿if ￿2 goes to zero.
Contrary to AR we have information on store coverage at the product level
in each time period. Coverage is measured as the proportion of stores each
product is in, weighted by each store size in terms of CSD sales. This is denoted
by rjt, where 0 < rjt ￿ 1. A value of one in rjt indicates that the product
is sold in all stores in period t. We now compare our actual measure of store
coverage with the AR proxies.
We use our data to estimate AR store coverage proxies as in (i) and (ii).
Our dependent variable, rjt, has variability across products and time, whereas
the explanatory variable (number of products) changes only over time, Jt. We
suggest the following speci￿cation
rjt = f(Jt;￿)exp(￿jt); (1)
where ￿jt is the composite error, which we decompose into a time function h(t),
product random e⁄ects ￿j, and a pure idiosyncratic error ujt,
￿jt ￿ h(t) + ￿j + ujt;
with ￿ and u assumed to follow independent distributions.
6Now, given that the main explanatory variables suggested in AR vary only
over time, we average (1) with respect to the product dimension and take the
natural log, to give the following relation,
lnr:t = lnf(Jt;￿) + h(t) + ￿: + u:t: (2)
The function f(Jt;￿) may be, either [￿1=Jt + (1 ￿ ￿1)] under AR speci￿-
cation (i), or J
￿2
t under AR speci￿cation (ii). The results of the nonlinear
estimations of equation (2) under the functional forms (i) and (ii) are docu-
mented in Table 3. Both estimates of ￿ (b ￿1 = 1 and b ￿2 = ￿0:9) indicate
product ￿congestion￿ . The predicted value of the AR proxy is depicted in the
bottom panel of Figure 2. It delineates a down-trend, suggesting that product
congestion has increased over time due to an increase in the number of prod-
ucts marketed (see the middle panel of Figure 2). Now we turn to the actual
variability of our coverage variable (top part of Figure 2). The lower value of
the boxes in Figure 2 is associated with the 25th percentile of the distribution,
the upper value to the 75th percentile, and the line in the box captures the
median value. Clearly the distribution of product coverage has increased in its
variability over time, and this e⁄ect has been accompanied by a slight decrease
in the median product coverage. We will use the estimated AR proxy and our
product level, time varying, store coverage data in our empirical work. Given
that the AR proxy varies only over time, we cannot expect it to capture any
change in the within period product-level store coverage heterogeneity. This is
something we want to remember when interpreting the role of the AR proxy in
the estimations that will follow.
3 The Structural Model
In every period t a population of Nt individuals decides which of the available
Jt +1 products to buy (where the +1 denotes an outside composite good). We
stick to the existing discrete choice literature and assume individual preferences
are represented in an indirect random utility function. In the next section we
present alternative speci￿cations of the demand side.
3.1 Demand Speci￿cations
3.1.1 Logit Model
We de￿ne market size in terms of an average individual consumption of a can
(220 ml) of soft carbonates per day. Consumer i￿ s indirect utility, i = 1;2;:::;Nt,
7for product j, j = 0;1;:::;Jt, in retail store r;r = 1;2;:::;Rt, in period t, t =
1;2;:::;T, can be expressed linearly as
uijrt = ￿(yit ￿ pjt) + x ￿
jt￿ + ￿jt + ￿ijt + ￿r"ijrt; (3)
where xjt is a column vector of k￿observable product characteristics (inclusive
of a constant), yit is the income of individual i in period t, pjt denotes the price of
the product in the period, and ￿jt gathers any possible remaining unobservable
(to the econometrician) product-period-level e⁄ects. As suggested by AR, the
composite error term can be decomposed into a consumer i￿ s period-product-
speci￿c taste, ￿ijt, and consumer i￿ s period-product-retail store -speci￿c taste;
"ijrt. The parameter ￿r is a measure of the relative variance of the two random
error variates.9
We de￿ne
￿jt ￿ x ￿
jt￿ ￿ ￿pjt + ￿jt
to be the mean utility over individuals and products.10 As typical in the discrete
choice literature, consumers can opt for an outside composite good whose utility
can be represented by,
ui0rt = ￿yit + ￿0t + ￿i0t + ￿r"i0rt: (4)
Now, assuming that "ijrt follows an iid type-I extreme value distribution and
that ￿ijt is distributed such that, ￿ijt + ￿r"ijrt is an iid type-I extreme value
(see Cardell, 1997), we can derive the following adjusted (for store coverage)










9The subscript r in the ￿ parameter has to be understood as a simple label, rather than
a parameter that is store-speci￿c (which here would indicate heteroskedasticity in the error
component). The same interpretation will be on, for the ￿g and ￿p parameters that we will
introduce below.
10It is useful to contrast the indirect utility in (3), with a more classical logit version
uijrt = ￿yit + ￿jt + "irt:
The latter is basically a standard logit, with the only di⁄erence being that the idiosyncratic
error, ", is iid over stores rather than over products. Here, if one assumes stores to sell
all products, the classical logit and standard logit would back out the same market share
function, as con￿rmed in Figure 3. Needless to say, the classical logit is rather unrealistic, as
it assumes stores to carry all products, while in reality they carry only an incomplete number.
In addition to that, one can expect a certain degree of correlation for the same product sold
across di⁄erent stores. Hence, the indirect utility in (3) o⁄ers a more realistic representation.
The underlying tree and derived market share function (demand function) are depicted in
Figure 4.
8where Rjt is the total number of retail stores carrying product j in period t,
and the term ￿yit cancels out due to the way we have speci￿ed the utility.11
The derivation of the term R
￿r
jt is discussed in Appendix (6.A).
Next, if we divide the numerator and denominator of (5) by a function of the
total number of stores in the economy in period t, i.e., R
￿r
t , we can re-express





















where rjt = Rjt=Rt; and the new de￿nition of the mean utility ￿
r
jt, now accounts
for the observable store coverage e⁄ect and relates to ￿jt in the following way
￿
r
jt ￿ ￿jt + ￿r lnrjt:
Here, as is common, we set the mean utility of the outside composite good to
zero, ￿0t = 0. Moreover, we assume such a good to be carried in all stores in
all periods, so that r0t = r0 = 1. If we take the natural log of each product￿ s
market share in (6) normalized with respect to the outside composite good we
obtain the following reduced form equation which we estimate as our demand
system for products,
lnsjt ￿ lns0t = x ￿
jt￿ + ￿r lnrjt ￿ ￿pjt + ￿jt:
So far we have been indirectly thinking of stores carrying only one product,
while in reality stores carry portfolios of products, which have to compete for
shelf space. The extension from single-product store to multi-product store is
rather immediate. We leave to the reader to visualize how Figure (4) can be
extended to this latter case. Once stores carry di⁄erent products, rjt becomes
our e⁄ective measure of store coverage: the proportion of stores each product
is in, weighted by stores market shares (measured in terms of sales). The next
section extends this logit model to a nested logit framework.
3.1.2 Nested Logit Model
We follow AR and rewrite the indirect utility function as,









and the corresponding function for the outside good as,









11This speci￿cation justi￿es the fact that we do not have individual income data.
9where, again, we normalize ￿0t to zero and r0t = r0 to one, and ￿nd that ￿yit
cancels out when we subtract ui0rt from uijrt.
Unlike equation (3), we now allow the random part of the utility to depend,
each period t, on individuals taste for segment g, g = 1;2;:::;Gt, individuals
taste for products, and individuals product-store taste. Along with the random
component we allow for a deterministic part which consists of an individual
income, and the (product) mean utility ￿jt, previously de￿ned. Assuming "ijrt
follows an iid type-I extreme value distribution, ￿
2
ijt to have an iid distribution
such that ￿
2
ijt + ￿r"ijrt is type-I extreme value, and ￿
1
igt to have an iid distrib-








; we can back out nested logit market
shares. De￿ning sj=g to be the within group market share and sg to be the




















jt is the mean utility de￿ned in the previous section to account for the











; (j;l 2 Jgt);
with Jgt we denote the set of products marketed in segment g in period t.12
As is usual we express the nested logit speci￿cation as the product of two
logits,
sjt = sj=g;tsgt: (9)
Using the Berry (1994) inversion, equation (9) can be rewritten as
lnsjt ￿ lns0t = ￿
r
jt + (1 ￿ ￿g)lnsj=g;t; (10)
In the next section we generalize the model further and allow retail store
coverage to be embedded in a random coe¢ cient nested logit model.
3.1.3 Random Coe¢ cient Nested Logit Model
We now enrich the previous analysis by allowing random coe¢ cients on the price
(and income) parameters so that the indirect utility function can be cast as
uijrt = ￿i (yit ￿ pjt) + x ￿









12This approach is a little restricted in the sense that one might prefer to model goods in
one segment to crowd out (in terms of retail space) goods in the same segment more than
goods in di⁄erent segments.
10with the utility for the outside good (with ￿0t = 0 and r0t = r0 = 1) as,









where we have assumed the inside and outside market individual marginal util-
ities of income to be the same, so that in the process of aggregation the ￿iyit
term cancels out.
The random coe¢ cient term can be written as





i is assumed to follow a standardized lognormal distribution.




















juijrt ￿ uilrt;8l = 0;1;:::;Jt; t = 1;2;:::;T
￿
where,
￿t = [￿1;￿2;:::;￿Jt] ￿:
Product market shares are obtained by integrating over the joint distributions
of individual characteristics and stores,





















joint distribution of vp; we can simplify the above relation to,













Under the assumption that the composite error follows a type I extreme value
distribution we can write individual probabilities of buying product j in period
t as,



































; (j;l 2 Jgt): (14)








We have detailed three alternative demand side models. For the cost (￿sup-
ply￿ ) side, we postulate constant product-period-speci￿c marginal costs, cjt,
and deal with multi-product price setting ￿rms. We assume the existence of a






(plt ￿ clt)slt (p1t;p2t;:::;pJt)Nt; (j;l 2 Jft;f = 1;￿￿￿ ;Ft);
where Jft is the set of products marketed by ￿rm f in period t. Given the total













@pjt; if products (j;l 2 Jft;f = 1;￿￿￿ ;Ft)
0; otherwise
;









where Ot is period t￿ s ￿rms￿ownership matrix, and a dot indicates an element
by element operation.13
The resulting pricing equations are
pt = ct + ￿
￿1
t st | {z }
mt
: (18)
which can be re-expressed at the product-period level as,
pjt = cjt + mjt; (19)
13The ownership matrix Ot, is nothing more than a Jt ￿ Jt matrix of ones and zeros. The
ones indicate products owned by the same ￿rms.
12where mjt is the markup of product j in period t. Thus, the ￿rst order
condition in (16) can be read as price equals marginal cost plus a mark-up, and
given the primitives of the demand system one can use the pricing equation to
back out marginal costs for each product.
As standard in the literature, we keep our model simple by postulating the
existence of a linear relation between constant marginal costs and observable
and unobservable (to the econometrician) product characteristics,
cjt = w ￿
jt￿ + !jt: (20)
Having de￿ned the demand and cost functions, we now outline the consumer
welfare in the models.
3.3 Consumer Welfare
Consumer welfare is de￿ned as the monetary utility individuals receive by choos-










Its inverse is used to convert consumers welfare in monetary terms. Small
and Rosen (1981) have shown that in the case of iid extreme value idiosyncratic
errors, and utilities linear in income, the expected consumer welfare has a closed
form that, under our speci￿cations, is written as follows:
1. Logit: Adjusting Train￿ s (2003) formula to our notation we express con-







However, due to the random composite error in the utility we are only






























A + K1t; (21)
where K1t is an unknown constant.
2. Nested logit: This computation is an immediate extension of the logit




























where the term in curly brackets corresponds to the natural log of the
denominator of sgt formulated in equation (8).
3. Random coe¢ cients nested logit: Here, we readapt a formula from
































where ￿i is the random coe¢ cient introduced in equation (11).
Note that in none of the above speci￿cations we are able to compute the level
of expected consumer surplus: only changes in expected consumers surpluses
can be identi￿ed. Consequently, in our welfare computations we will choose a
speci￿cation as reference category, and compute the changes in welfare generated
by deviations from that default scenario.
3.4 Counterfactual
We have seen that our data on store coverage by products suggest the existence
of ￿congestion￿e⁄ects. A natural counterfactual would impose standard logit
errors with a ￿standard logit model￿ . We do this by assuming all products have
full coverage (rjt = r0 = 1, and
XJt
l=0
rlt = Jt + 1, 8t). In essence, stores are
asked to create (free of charge and without a⁄ecting inventories) extra space in
their shelves to allow for the presence of all CSD products.
We keep as primitives the parameters of demand and marginal cost functions
that we have estimated observing our true measure rjt of store coverage, and
under the assumption of full retail coverage, we compute the new equilibrium
price in the market. In order to calculate the new equilibrium we use fsolve
14in Matlab and unravel, for every period, a system of Jt nonlinear equations
in pt (the pricing equations with the demand equations substituted in). The
procedure for each of the three demand speci￿cations is reported in appendix
6.B.14 Having solved for the new equilibrium, we recompute the price elasticities
at the new prices and market shares. We also calculate the change in welfare
that results from moving from one equilibrium to another.15
4 Econometrics and Results
We need to estimate the demand and ￿supply￿equations derived in the previous
section. An important issue in empirical IO is how to deal with the endogeneity
in pricing. Prices are endogenous due to their correlation with demand unob-
servables (through unobserved quality) and supply unobservables (through the
markup function). The empirical IO literature has well documented price en-
dogeneity due to the fact that part of a given product￿ s quality is observed by
consumers and producers, but not by the econometrician. In the simple logit
speci￿cation this translates into an upward bias of the Least Squares estimation
of the price parameter (due to an underlying positive correlation between price
and quality).16 By-products of this bias include: inelastic estimates of demand
elasticities of substitution, overestimation of markups and, in extreme cases,
negative marginal costs. The literature has however suggested useful instru-
ments to overcome this issue [Hausman and Taylor (1981), Berry (1994), BLP,
Fershman et al. (1999), Nevo (2000a, 2000b, 2001), amongst others].
In our paper, on top of this simultaneity issue, we also consider the role
of an important unobservable variable in consumer taste. Product coverage of
stores is a typical (relevant) omitted variable in the product-level estimation
literature.17 As an omitted variable, depending on the underlying correlation,
it could worsen, improve, or leave unaltered the endogeneity e⁄ect. In appendix
6.C we delineate a theoretical aside on how simultaneity and omitted variable ef-
fects can interact. Regardless, observing store coverage may not be the panacea
14The same appendix also provides some useful algebra on the three demand speci￿cations
and their counterfactual.
15We rely here on the assumption of uniqueness of equilibria, but we are aware that the
nonlinearity of the Jt system of equations is a fertile soil for multiple equilibria. If this is the
case, we hope the equilibrium we pick up is the only reasonable one in economic terms.
16Note that we expect the price parameter to be negative, and thus the upward bias in our
case would translate into a lower absolute value of the associated parameter.
17It is fair to add that this latter bias could be eliminated if one could ￿nd ￿ideal instru-
ments￿ that simultaneously: i) mitigate (or annul) the simultaneity bias induced by unob-
served product quality and ii) yield results that are uncorrelated with store coverage (see
appendix 6.C for details).
15to the problem, as store coverage could be correlated with unobserved product
quality, and therefore be itself an endogenous variable (something that we will
test in our econometrics). The above discussion can be extended to the nested
logit speci￿cation, although in this case, the sign of the price parameter bias
is less intuitive. The way in which the within segment market share relates to
both unobserved quality and to price will be important.
We address the problem of endogeneity using a set of instruments, and in
keeping with BLP, we postulate the following conditional moments independen-
cies,
E(￿jtjz1t) = E(!jtjz2t) = 0 (22)
E[(￿jt;!jt) ￿(￿jt;!jt)jzt] = ￿(zjt);
where zt ￿ fz1t;z2tg. The second condition in (22) allows for heteroskedasticity
in demand and supply unobservables￿conditional variances.
We separate the parameters in a linear set ￿1, and a non-linear set ￿2, with
￿ ￿ f￿1;￿2g. We combine linear and nonlinear GMM estimators, as in BLP and
Nevo (2000a). As part of our estimation procedure, we compute an estimator
of the asymptotic variance-covariance of the linear and non-linear parameters.
This requires us to calculate the gradient of the GMM functions with respect to
the parameters and, whenever possible, we make use of analytical solutions. We
succeed in providing analytical solutions for the gradient of each demand side
speci￿cation, and employ numerical derivations for the more complex ￿supply￿
side. The analytical gradient of the nonlinear parameters entering the demand
side random coe¢ cient nested logit requires a rather tedious derivation, which
we outline in Appendix 6.D.
4.1 Instruments
A heated debate among those that use the GMM estimator is the choice of
instruments. Newey (1990) shows the e¢ cient set of instruments for nonlin-
ear models to be equal to the conditional expectation of the derivative of the
conditional moments with respect to the parameters vector. Unfortunately this
conditional expectation is very di¢ cult, if not impossible, to compute utilizing
our nonlinear estimation. Consequently, we resort to selecting our instruments
based upon their power and validity in conjunction with their underlying eco-
nomic signi￿cance. Appendix 6.E fully details our choice of the instruments,
which relies on a four step procedure. In step one we investigate the power of
16the instruments by regressing our endogenous variables over alternative sets of
instruments. In step two, we select the signi￿cant instruments and compute a
demand side GMM to verify the validity of the chosen instruments. Step three
avails of the estimated demand primitives from step two and deduces estimated
marginal costs; accessing the power of supply side variables. The last step,
checks for the validity of the instruments for those endogenous variables that
directly, or via functional forms, enter the GMM pricing equation. The idea is
to explore the power and validity of the instruments separately for demand and
supply, which will help in our choice of instruments for the joint estimates of
demand and supply.
Below we list and de￿ne the instruments that performed best in the correc-
tion of the price endogeneity and, where applicable, the store coverage endo-
geneity. These include BLP type instruments, such as the number of products
and the sum of the product characteristics that proxy for the intensity of com-
petition or product di⁄erentiation in our structural model of equilibrium. We
divide these two types of instruments into summations over products belonging
to the same ￿rm and summations over products of other ￿rms, for each period,
as follows:
z1: the sum of other products belonging to the ￿rm;
z2: the sum of months to stock out of other products of the ￿rm;
z3: the sum of log store coverage of other products of the ￿rm (when store
coverage is observable and exogenous);
z4: the sum of products of other ￿rms;
z5: the sum of months to stock out of products of other ￿rms;
z6: the sum of log store coverage of products of other ￿rms (when store
coverage is observable and exogenous).
In addition we use Hausman and Taylor (1981) type instruments, aimed at
capturing common underlying cost shifters:
z7: initial condition of average price of products outside the segment the
￿rm belongs to;
z8: initial condition of average log store coverage of products outside the
segment the ￿rm belongs to (when store coverage is observable and endogenous).
4.2 Results
In each of our speci￿cations we explore the following scenarios in which: i) store
coverage is not observable; ii) store coverage, sc, is proxied by the AR variable
(predicted from the nonlinear estimates set out in Table 3); iii) store coverage,
17is observable.18
The Least Squares estimates of our demand systems are reported in Table
4. If we look at the R2 for our logit model we see that when store coverage is
either omitted, or proxied for by AR, only 36% of the variability of demand is
explained. On the other hand, once we account for store coverage with actual
data, a good 83% of the variability is captured. The nested logit speci￿cation
has the advantage of reducing the discrepancy among the three scenarios, by
moving from an R2 of almost 88%, in case of omitted or proxied store coverage,
to an R2 over 91% in case of store coverage being observable. The table also pro-
vides evidence that the AR proxy helps little in correcting for the bias that the
omitted coverage produces in the price and log of within segment market share
coe¢ cients. Our observable store coverage variable is much more informative,
being both product- and period-speci￿c. For example, if we compare Columns
1 and 3 for the logit case, we observe the estimated price coe¢ cient to be (in
absolute value) lower, when we account for store coverage. This direction of the
estimated price e⁄ect suggests that the simultaneity bias is ampli￿ed when one
allows for store coverage. However, such a tendency in the price parameter is
not shared by the nested logit speci￿cations. As we can see from a comparison
of columns 4 and 6, the price parameter here rises (in absolute value). This
change in direction is caused by the correlation that the log of within market
shares and log of store coverage have with prices (as one can note from Table
5).
A common feature of the various scenarios and speci￿cations of Table 4 is
the high number of estimated negative marginal costs, which we have discussed
as being driven primarily by a simultaneity bias. We tackle the simultaneity
bias by jointly estimating the demand and ￿supply￿ equations by GMM. As
already anticipated in the previous section, the selection of instruments relies
upon a trade-o⁄ between power and validity. We present descriptive statistics
of the instruments and their correlations, along with some relevant variables, in
Tables 5 and 6. We report our ￿nal choice of instruments in a footnote of Table
7.
If we compare the Least Squares estimates for the logit and nested logit
speci￿cations of Table 4, with the equivalent joint GMM estimates of Table 7,
we note that both the (￿￿) price parameter, and the ￿g within segment market
share, are heavily downward biased in the OLS estimations. On the other hand,
the store coverage parameter ￿r is only downward biased in the nested logit
18Due to its poor performance, we do not include the AR variable in the random coe¢ cient
nested logit speci￿cation.
18speci￿cation that has observable store coverage.
The demand side of Table 7 separately reports the linear and nonlinear
estimated parameters.19 The store coverage parameter ￿r, is not estimated well
in the logit speci￿cations, as the estimate exceeds the unitary theoretical upper
bound of its support. Only under the richer nested logit speci￿cation do we get
reasonable values for ￿r. We then observe that using the actual store coverage in
the nested logit and random coe¢ cient nested logit speci￿cations brings about
the estimate of ￿r to a value around 0:7, as it corrects for the bias.
We now turn our attention to the nonlinear parameters. The negative of the
mean price e⁄ect estimated coe¢ cient (￿￿) is signi￿cant and varies between 3
and 3:8 among the di⁄erent speci￿cations. We do not ￿nd the standard devi-
ation parameter of the random coe¢ cient nested logit speci￿cation ￿p, to be
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, particularly when store coverage is observable.
This is due to a lack of individual observable characteristics in our data, and
subsequently to a poor set of available instruments. Another nonlinear parame-
ter is the one attached to the within segment market share ￿g. Only the nested
logit speci￿cation based on the AR proxy poorly estimates ￿g. The other spec-
i￿cations and scenarios furnish a signi￿cant estimated parameter in the range
of 0:55 and 0:65.
The results on the supply side do not provide evidence of a signi￿cant role
of inventory and store coverage in the marginal cost function for the logit or
nested logit speci￿cations, but are signi￿cant and of the right sign in the ran-
dom coe¢ cient models. Declining inventories increase cost, and store coverage
reduces cost. Still, ￿rm, packaging and seasonal dummies do capture most of
the marginal cost variability.
Table 7 also displays useful statistics that can help us select the best spec-
i￿cation. The pseudo R2 of the demand side R2
D, emphasizes the strong role
that the observability of store coverage has in explaining the pure product-level
variability. As for the supply side, the pseudo R2
S is always above 70 percent.
The J￿statistic is informative on the validity of the instruments. Figures of the
p-value below 0:05 indicate that some of the moment conditions are not sup-
ported by the data at the 5 percent level. An important statistic is the number
of negative marginal costs. We elaborate on this outcome for counterfactuals
when we use a selected demand model.
Based on the above discussion on the estimated parameters and various
statistics, we feel con￿dent that the best estimation results come from the nested
logit with observed store coverage. This one shows all but one marginal cost to
19Nonlinear parameters are those that enter the markup function.
19be nonnegative; a good overidenti￿cation test on the instruments to accept the
null hypothesis of valid moment restrictions; and the average estimated part of
the product-level variability for demand and supply to be around 80 percent. In
addition, the estimated parameters all seem reasonable from an economic point
of view.
Table 8 presents the estimates of the average price elasticity of substitution,
price and marginal cost, over the last period T.20 Our calculation of the esti-
mates of own and cross price elasticities at the product level, are based on the
formulae developed in appendix 6B. We aggregate (market share weighted) over
primitives of products by de￿ned groupings in terms of store coverage (low and
high; full in the counterfactual). We have 90 products with a coverage below
50 per cent, and 64 products with a coverage above 50 per cent coverage of the
market. Within the groupings, the cross price elasticities that are presented
are a weighted sum of cross price e⁄ects for each product. The computed price
per liter is also a weighted sum, as is the estimated marginal cost per product.
We do our analysis using estimates based on parameters from the Logit and
Nested Logit demand systems to demonstrate our results. We wish to compare
our demand and supply outcomes in the case when we use the actual data on
store coverage, to outcomes produced from our counterfactual that imposes full
store coverage of all products in the market. This gives us an idea of what the
outcomes would look like if consumers did not su⁄er disutility from products
being unavailable in stores, which is the assumption embedded in standard logit
errors. We express, in millions of Irish pounds, the change in pro￿t and con-
sumer welfare that result from moving to full coverage. This is the result of the
di⁄erence between outcomes in the counterfactual and those in the preferred
scenario where store coverage observable.
In Table 8 we ￿rst analyze the logit model. The results of the counterfactual
indicate that products starting from low coverage do have a jump in the intensity
of competition in the market coming from cross price e⁄ects. In addition, own
prices and costs do go up. In products starting from a position of high coverage,
while the cross-price e⁄ects go up, the own price and costs go down. Overall,
pro￿ts in the market increase as does consumer welfare. This is because of the
increased competition coming from the smaller products expanding coverage
steals market share in both the inside and outside markets. Once again, in
the nested logit model we compare our results using actual store coverage data
to that simulated when full store coverage by each product is imposed on the
20For brevity, we show only the last period, although we have computed elasticities, price
equilibrium, and marginal costs for all periods.
20model. The results are similar to the logit model. In products starting from a
low coverage we see a jump in the intensity of cross price competition in the
market with own prices and costs rising. In products starting from a position
of high coverage we also see a jump in the intensity of cross price competition
but own price and costs do go down. Overall pro￿ts in the market increase as
does consumer welfare. This welfare gain is weaker than the logit model, as the
segmentation of the market protects products from increased competition from
those outside their segment or from the outside good.
In Table 9 we take the own and cross price e⁄ects of all products in every
period within ten intervals of store coverage and test whether the estimated
price e⁄ects in the estimated logit and nested logit models with full coverage
are di⁄erent to the counterfactual that imposes full coverage in each of these ten
intervals. We present the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality
of distributions. We ￿nd that while own price e⁄ects are not so di⁄erent, the
distribution of cross price e⁄ects are radically di⁄erent. The own price e⁄ect is
an outcome of two forces. For low coverage products the counterfactual reduces
disutility for the product greatly, leading to an expansion in market share and
downward pricing. High coverage products bene￿t less from the counterfactual.
They lose market share and charge lower prices to protect pro￿ts. Overall, own
price e⁄ects do not change too much but their components do.
Tables 10 repeats the analysis of Table 8; but this time we focus on demand
and cost outcomes within the bigger segments of the market. In particular,
Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit ￿ avour segments in Standard and
2-Liter packaging. The general result is that using standard logit errors would
lead to overestimates of the demand (welfare and price elasticities) and cost
outcomes. Ignoring product congestion inside stores by using standard logit
errors can signi￿cantly bias estimates of price elasticities and costs upwards.
Markets would be estimated to be far more competitive than they really are.
Any counterfactual that is based on these primitives is also likely to generate
inaccurate results. In summary, our results support the Monte Carlo results of
AR.
5 Conclusions
Consumers can face a congestion in their choice set of products within stores.
Following Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) we allow logit errors to represent idio-
syncratic unobserved consumer preferences over retail stores and products. Hav-
ing product level data on store coverage we estimate their logit, nested logit
21and random coe¢ cients logit models of product demand jointly with cost in a
structural model of equilibrium for products in retail Carbonated Soft Drinks.
Allowing for store coverage has a very signi￿cant impact on the estimated para-
meters and the predictive power of our structural model. In our counterfactual
we impose full-coverage (no congestion) on our data and evaluate demand price
elasticities and welfare. We see that the own and cross price elasticities gener-
ally get larger in the new equilibrium. Building structural models of industries
with standard logit errors overlooks a key aspect of product di⁄erentiation, i.e.
consumers having di⁄erent choice sets inside stores. Products inside markets
tend to be more protected from competition than allowed by the modeler. As
we show this leads to inaccurate oversized estimates of demand price elastici-
ties and consumer welfare inside industries. Any subsequent counterfactual on
the likely e⁄ect of mergers or price coordination could lead to very misleading
conclusions.
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25Table 1: Segments quantity and price levels, averaged Oct.’ 92 –May ‘ 97










Cola Can 6 5 1.43 1,486 4.22 2,116 8.02
Cola Standard 11 5 1.26 1,333 3.78 1,692 6.41
Cola  1.5 liter 3 3 0.75 893 2.53 672 2.55
Cola  2 liter 5 4 0.50 3,867 10.97 1,945 7.37
Cola Can Multipacks 5 2 0.96 678 1.92 648 2.46
Orange Can 6 4 1.38 653 1.85 887 3.36
Orange Standard 10 6 1.27 741 2.10 931 3.53
Orange  1.5 liter 5 4 0.68 781 2.22 535 2.03
Orange  2 liter 5 4 0.46 3,000 8.51 1,382 5.24
Orange  Can Multipacks 3 3 0.97 174 0.49 170 0.64
Lemonade Can 4 2 1.41 498 1.41 699 2.65
Lemonade Standard 5 2 1.16 487 1.38 569 2.16
Lemonade 1.5 liter 3 2 0.71 1,323 3.75 939 3.56
Lemonade  2 liter 4 2 0.47 4,140 11.75 1,941 7.35
Lemonade Can Multipacks 2 1 0.97 128 0.36 124 0.47
Mixed Fruit Can 7 5 1.39 752 2.13 1,045 3.96
Mixed Fruit Standard 19 10 1.37 2,217 6.29 3,128 11.85
Mixed Fruit 1.5 liter 7 6 0.74 633 1.80 465 1.76
Mixed Fruit  2 liter 8 6 0.41 6,612 18.76 2,635 9.99
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks 1 1 0.83 8 0.02 6 0.02
Diet Cola Can 4 3 1.39 392 1.11 542 2.05
Diet Cola Standard 3 3 1.30 328 0.93 424 1.61
Diet Cola  1.5 liter 4 2 0.75 293 0.83 221 0.84
Diet Cola  2 liter 4 3 0.55 1,005 2.85 537 2.03
Diet Cola Can Multipacks 3 2 0.96 222 0.63 213 0.81
Diet Orange Can 2 1 1.27 83 0.23 106 0.40
Diet Orange Standard 1 1 1.19 16 0.05 19 0.07
Diet Orange  1.5 liter 1 1 0.71 76 0.21 54 0.20
Diet Orange  2 liter 3 2 0.56 254 0.72 141 0.53
Diet Lemonade Can 2 2 1.44 186 0.53 268 1.01
Diet Lemonade Standard 1 1 1.29 75 0.21 96 0.36
Diet Lemonade 1.5 liter 1 1 0.73 572 1.62 415 1.57
Diet Lemonade  2 liter 2 1 0.59 1,198 3.40 699 2.65
Diet Lemonade Can Multipacks 1 1 0.96 74 0.21 71 0.27
Diet Mixed Fruit Can 2 2 1.27 14 0.04 18 0.07
Diet Mixed Fruit Standard 2 2 1.17 14 0.04 17 0.06
Diet Mixed Fruit  1.5 liter 1 1 0.83 1 0.00 1 0.00
Diet Mixed Fruit  2 liter 1 1 0.55 40 0.11 22 0.08
Total 157 107 35,249 100 26,388 100
26Table 2: Segments  store  coverage  and  inventory  l evels,  May ‘ 9 3  ( initial),  May ‘ 95













Cola Can 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.53 0.53 0.67
Cola Standard 0.69 0.86 0.89 0.60 0.47 0.53
Cola  1.5 liter 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.70 0.53 0.63
Cola  2 liter 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.47 0.40 0.43
Cola Can Multipacks 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.37 0.37
Orange Can 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.83 0.70 0.90
Orange Standard 0.81 0.72 0.71 0.83 0.53 0.67
Orange  1.5 liter 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.73 0.57 0.77
Orange  2 liter 0.70 0.61 0.62 0.43 0.43 0.53
Orange  Can Multipacks 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.63 0.63 0.47
Lemonade Can 0.91 0.95 0.84 0.87 0.60 0.90
Lemonade Standard 0.81 0.74 0.82 0.87 0.60 0.60
Lemonade 1.5 liter 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.57 0.37 0.50
Lemonade  2 liter 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.50 0.40 0.37
Lemonade Can Multipacks 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.63 0.33 0.53
Mixed Fruit Can 0.87 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.60 0.93
Mixed Fruit Standard 0.92 0.80 0.76 0.80 0.57 0.73
Mixed Fruit 1.5 liter 0.54 0.47 0.41 0.97 0.60 0.87
Mixed Fruit  2 liter 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.33 0.50
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks 0.84 0.80 0.04 0.70 0.63 0.10
Diet Cola Can 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.80 0.67 0.77
Diet Cola Standard 0.55 0.76 0.89 0.50 0.77 0.63
Diet Cola  1.5 liter 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.47 0.43 0.70
Diet Cola  2 liter 0.69 0.41 0.68 1.00 0.33 0.43
Diet Cola Can Multipacks 0.51 0.69 0.41 0.93 0.70 0.27
Diet Orange Can 0.45 0.46 0.70 0.53 0.77 0.90
Diet Orange Standard 0.84 0.48 0.52 0.80 0.40 0.73
Diet Orange  1.5 liter 0.84 0.91 0.35 0.67 0.53 1.13
Diet Orange  2 liter 0.60 0.54 0.51 0.43 0.43 0.50
Diet Lemonade Can 0.35 0.85 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.80
Diet Lemonade Standard 0.49 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.33 0.23
Diet Lemonade 1.5 liter 0.01 0.32 0.84 0.10 0.27 0.53
Diet Lemonade  2 liter 0.36 0.22 0.77 0.67 1.30 0.33
Diet Lemonade Can Multipacks 0.95 0.33 0.35 0.53 0.23 0.43
Diet Mixed Fruit Can 0.69 0.93 0.17 0.60 0.53 1.23
Diet Mixed Fruit Standard 0.84 0.86 0.37 0.70 0.47 0.67
Diet Mixed Fruit  1.5 liter 0.68 0.84 0.38 0.47 0.53 0.40
Diet Mixed Fruit  2 liter 0.43 0.74 0.94 0.53 0.40 0.67
Average 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.66 0.52 0.61
27Table 3: Nonlinear Least Squares estimations of retail store coverage
Parameters Speci￿cation (i) Speci￿cation (ii)
t 0.020*** (0.007) 0.015*** (0.009)
t2
100 -0.044*** (0.017) -0.035*** (0.019)







￿1 = 1 -0.000 (0.001)
￿2 = ￿1 0.100 (0.179)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: OLS demand estimation. Dependent variable ln(s/s0)
Parameters OLS OLS AR OLS SC NOLS NOLS AR NOLS SC
Logit Nested Logit
￿1 [cons] -5.619*** -4.236*** -5.473*** -2.876*** -2.639*** -3.759***
(0.503) (0.645) (0.258) (0.221) (0.284) (0.186)
￿2 [inv] -21.156*** -21.192*** -5.866*** -4.224*** -4.240*** -3.071***
(1.015) (1.013) (0.543) (0.466) (0.466) (0.390)
￿￿ [p] 0.925*** 0.923*** 0.746*** 0.029 0.029 0.257***
(0.159) (0.158) (0.081) (0.070) (0.070) (0.059)
￿r [lry] 1.869*** 1.091*** 0.323 0.501***
(0.548) (0.011) (0.241) (0.013)
(1 ￿ ￿g) [ls=g] 0.912*** 0.911*** 0.596***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
STATISTICS
N. 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644
N. mc<0 2733 2741 3317 3644 3644 3525
R2 0.360 0.363 0.832 0.877 0.877 0.914
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, y AR proxy in the AR scenarios.
Not reported ￿rm, segment, and (package x time) ￿xed e⁄ects.
28Table 5: Instruments and main variables correlation matrix
s p lsg stkout lrj z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8
s 1.00
p -0.31 1.00
lsg 0.39 -0.13 1.00
inv -0.18 0.10 -0.29 1.00
lrj 0.32 -0.08 0.78 -0.30 1.00
z1 0.05 0.01 0.24 -0.07 0.12 1.00
z2 0.05 0.01 0.24 -0.06 0.14 0.94 1.00
z3 -0.07 -0.02 -0.15 0.08 -0.04 -0.90 -0.81 1.00
z4 -0.05 0.03 -0.33 0.04 -0.25 -0.65 -0.66 0.32 1.00
z5 -0.05 0.04 -0.29 0.04 -0.23 -0.54 -0.55 0.23 0.90 1.00
z6 0.04 -0.04 0.28 -0.02 0.24 0.32 0.35 0.01 -0.91 -0.85 1.00
z7 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.16 -0.10 -0.20 -0.18 0.16 1.00
z8 -0.01 0.25 0.12 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.11 0.10 -0.10 -0.62 1.00
Table 6: Descriptive statistics main variables and instruments
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
s 0.00 0.01 5.98E-06 0.08
p 0.99 0.43 0.29 4.54
lsg -2.54 2.04 -8.94 0
inv 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.68
lrj -1.33 1.57 -6.91 0
z1 32.65 17.97 0 57
z2 27.01 14.84 0 55.78
z3 -40.11 26.14 -94.79 0
z4 99.94 26.33 50 153
z5 86.93 23.86 40.37 147.28
z6 -142.92 65.32 -279.09 -39.81
z7 0.21 0.38 0 1.28
z8 -0.21 0.47 -2.86 0
29Table 7: GMM simultaneous estimation of demand and supply
D E M A N D (D ) Param eters L L A R L SC N L N L A R N L SC RC RC SC
L inear ￿1 [cons] -4.290*** -3.366** -2.652*** -4.248*** -3.481*** -2.853*** -3.231*** -2.219***
(1.176) (1.472) (1.014) (1.535) (1.644) (0.528) (0.472) (0.322)
￿2 [inv] -0.713*** -0.714*** -0.210*** -0.503*** -0.641*** -0.150*** -0.419*** -0.130***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.060) (0.125) (0.105) (0.057) (0.212) (0.047)
￿r [lry] 1.179*** 1.085*** 0.325*** 0.772*** 0.637***
(0.316) (0.020) (0.102) (0.128) (0.084)
N onlinear ￿￿ [p] 3.303*** 3.263*** 3.092*** 2.879** 3.499** 3.013*** 3.838*** 3.763***
(1.279) (1.341) (1.112) (1.486) (1.563) (0.564) (0.936) (0.838)
(1 ￿ ￿g) [ls=g] 0.353** 0.111 0.320*** 0.479*** 0.457***
(0.171) (0.140) (0.129) (0.204) (0.060)
￿p [p￿p
i ] 0.710 0.417
(0.942) (1.235)
SU P P LY (S)
L inear ￿1 [cons] 0.584*** 1.808 0.557*** 0.643*** 1.530*** 0.560*** 0.718*** 0.667***
(0.141) (1.914) (0.140) (0.193) (0.179) (0.071) (0.119) (0.130)
￿2 [inv] -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.019* 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010)
￿3 [lry] 1.466 -0.003 0.558*** 0.000 -0.032*
(2.275) (0.007) (0.039) (0.002) (0.020)
STAT IST IC S
P seudo R2
D 0.332 0.314 0.798 0.657 0.412 0.855 0.250 0.661
P seudo R2
S 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.729 0.809 0.763 0.770 0.784
J-stat 7.258 1.819 10.418 14.541 6.165 4.313 29.045 13.955
p-val J-stat 0.065 0.611 0.034 0.006 0.191 0.437 0.000 0.016
N . 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644
N . m c< 0 64 82 133 3 0 1 85 84
N . m c< 0 cft 158 0 88
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. R obust standard errors in parentheses. N ot rep orted ￿rm , segm ent,
and (package x tim e) ￿xed e⁄ects. y A R proxy for the A R scenarios. T he standard errors are robust and account for p otential
correlation b etw een dem and and supply unobservables at the pro duct level. We have not com puted the part of the asym ptotic variance-
covariance, induced by sim ulation errors, thus assum ing, as in N evo (2000a, 2001), this to b e a sm all and not in￿uential com p onent
Instrum ents:
[L : D = z2,z7; "S"= z1], [L A R : D = z2,z7; "S"= z1], [L SC : D = z3,z7; "S"= z4,z5].
[N L : D = z1,z2,z7; "S"= z7], [N L A R : D = z1,z2,z7; "S"= z5], [N L SC : D = z1,z3,z7; "S"= z4,z5].
[RC N L : D = z1,z2,z7; "S"= z4,z5], [RC N L SC : D = z1,z3,z7; "S"= z4,z5].
30Table 8: Estimates of price elasticities of substitution and marginal cost
Weighted Averages
using Market Shares




















SC Logit Low 90 -2.54 1.41 .82 .42
Counterfactual Full 90 -2.71 1.81 .89 .49
SC Logit High 64 -2.19 1.37 .72 .31
Counterfactual Full 64 -2.09 1.81 .69 .27
No Congestion-Full Change in Total Profit = 3.5 Change in Consumer Welfare= 10.4
Nested Logit
SC Nested Logit Low 90 -3.38 2.37 .82 .50
Counterfactual Full 90 -3.56 2.55 .90 .58
SC Nested Logit High 64 -2.61 1.80 .72 .37
Counterfactual Full 64 -2.52 2.18 .66 .32
No Congestion-Full Change in Total Profit =  1.71 Change in Consumer Welfare = 7.7
Table 9: Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test (reference distri-
bution observed store coverage)
Proportion
Store Coverage
[0 , .1) [.1 , .2) [.2 , .3) [.3 , .4) [.4 , .5) [.5 , .6) [.6 , .7) [.7 , .8) [.8 , .9) [.9 , 1]
N 662 192 211 370 502 445 333 311 318 300
Logit
L Cft (OP) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.50 0.62 0.64 0.85 0.40
L Cft (CP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nested Logit
NL Cft (OP) 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.75 0.93 0.87 0.50 0.18 0.00
NL Cft (CP) 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Reject if p<.05 (Bold values). OP=Own Price Elasticities; CP=Cross Price Elasticities




Shares of Brands, by



















SC Nested Logit .02 7 -6.41 3.02 1.45 1.18
Counterfactual Full 7 -4.59 3.14 0.86 0.48
SC Nested Logit .90 4 -4.31 1.98 1.23 0.85
Counterfactual  Full 4 -5.11 2.71 1.21 0.85
2 Liter Cola
SC Nested Logit .05 1 -1.88 2.06 0.42 0.20
Counterfactual Full 1 -1.87 2.29 0.43 0.20
SC Nested Logit .79 4 -1.65 1.56 0.49 0.11
Counterfactual Full 4 -1.67 1.93 0.47 0.11
Standard Orange
SC Nested Logit .12 6 -5.38 3.03 1.22 0.96
Counterfactual Full 6 -4.48 3.51 1.19 0.90
SC Nested Logit .74 4 -4.80 2.61 1.19 0.91
Counterfactual Full 4 -5.03 3.18 1.17 0.91
2 Liter Orange
SC Nested Logit .13 1 -2.36 2.02 0.54 0.20
Counterfactual Full 1 -2.30 2.21 0.55 0.20
SC Nested Logit .64 4 -1.89 1.89 0.47 0.19
Counterfactual Full 4 -1.92 2.18 0.49 0.19
Standard Lemonade
SC Nested Logit .08 2 -5.61 2.98 1.38 0.88
Counterfactual Full 2 -5.81 3.02 1.39 0.99
SC Nested Logit .84 3 -4.37 2.24 1.17 0.81
Counterfactual Full 3 -4.62 2.93 1.15 0.81
2 Liter Lemonade
SC Nested Logit .04 1 -2.23 2.01 0.50 0.10
Counterfactual Full 1 -2.15 2.29 0.50 0.10
SC Nested Logit .80 3 -1.69 1.58 0.49 0.12
Counterfactual Full 3 -1.71 1.94 0.47 0.12
Standard Mixed Fruit
SC Nested Logit .28 10 -3.80 3.11 0.88 0.63
Counterfactual Full 10 -4.73 3.13 1.13 0.88
SC Nested Logit .87 9 -6.07 2.93 1.45 1.19
Counterfactual Full 9 -6.10 3.26 1.40 1.15
2 Liter Mixed Fruit
SC Nested Logit .31 2 -1.91 1.81 0.43 0.16
Counterfactual Full 2 -1.81 2.18 0.41 0.15
SC Nested Logit .65 6 -1.52 1.45 0.38 0.11
Counterfactual Full 6 -1.55 2.06 0.38 0.11
32Figure 1: Bimonthly unit sales over the 28 bimonthly periods (JJ 93 is sales

















































































































































33Figure 2: Actual store coverage (top panel), number of products (center





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.A Derivation of equation (5)
For notational convenience in this section we omit subscripts i and t and con-
centrate on the role of products, j, and stores, r.
Cardell (1997) shows us that if "j is an iid extreme value random variable
with cdf F ("j) = e￿e
￿"j; and if ￿ is another random variable with ￿ ￿ C (￿r)
























Given the iid assumption, the cdf in (23) can easily be extended to the




















We wish to show the derivation of the logit demand in (5). We begin the
derivation by integrating over the distribution of stores carrying product j. We
follow Akiva and Lerhman (1985) and, for each product j, we compute the









This expectation requires us to recover the probability:
Pr
￿
ujr ￿ uj1;￿￿￿ ;ujr ￿ ujRj
￿
;
















































































































and that ln#jr = ￿"1
















j ln#jrd#jr = lnR
￿r
j :
We want to now ￿nd the probability that product j is chosen. The logic is
similar to the method just presented above for the store dimension. So we can




0 ￿ ￿j + lnR
￿r




J ￿ ￿j + lnR
￿r







One can notice (26) accounts for the composite good, 0. Also, we have dropped
the subscript r from the error term, as to give the idea that we have already




































































































































and further, if we de￿ne ￿j ￿ "1
j ￿ ￿j, we are able to derive the market share

























sj = e￿￿j: (28)
With some trivial algebraic manipulation one can show that equation (28)
is the same as our demand equation (5).
6.B Some Useful Algebra
6.B.1 Logit Speci￿cation
























































i2 = ￿sltsjt; if l 6= j;
where ￿
r
jt ￿ ￿jt + ￿r lnrjt, and ￿ > 0:



















where, a dot, ￿, indicates an operation element by element. The vector of market
share st is Jt ￿1, pt is a Jt ￿1 vector of prices, it is a Jt ￿1 vector of ones, and
It is a Jt ￿ Jt identity matrix.










= ￿pltslt if l 6= j;

































Logit Counterfactual Our counterfactual requires that we recompute the
underlying price equilibrium in the market. We do not worry here about multiple
equilibria. The price equilibrium that we observe is the one we are interested in,
and the new equilibrium that we compute is going to be the one of its neighbor.










t = ct + ￿
￿1
t sn




where the superscript n indicates the new values, and the mean utilities and
marginal costs without superscript r reference those under full store coverage.
The ￿rst Jt equations in (29a) represent our market shares (demand) equations
and the subsequent Jt equations (29b) the pricing equations. Notice that the
demand equations are inclusive of the direct changes provided by the counter-
factual (i.e. rjt = 1; 8j;t) and the indirect changes provided by the prices. All
of them enter via the products mean utility ￿t. We then substitute (29a) into
(29b) and obtain a Jt set of nonlinear pricing equations which is the system
of equations that has as a solution a new price equilibrium. We use fsolve in
Matlab to ￿nd the solution of this system. The algorithm updates prices (and
market shares) until there is convergence to the new equilibrium. Solutions are
found for each period t.
6.B.2 Nested Logit Speci￿cation























; if l 2 g and l 6= j;
@sjt
@plt
= ￿sjtslt; if l = 2 g and l 6= j;









































Notice that Mt is a block diagonal matrix that has along the diagonal sub-







































= ￿pltslt if l = 2 g and l 6= j;














































22The matrix Mt requires the products to be ordered by segments. Notice that matrices
Mgt along the diagonal have dim(Jgt); where dim(Jgt) is the number of products entering
segment g in period t.
42Nested Logit Counterfactual Given that a nested logit can be expressed
as the product of two logits, sjt = sj=g;tsgt, the technique used to compute our
counterfactual is similar to that outlined in subsection (6.B.1) with the addition
that, this time, we also need to update the within segment market shares and
be aware of the nested logit structure.
6.B.3 Random Coe¢ cients Nested Logit Speci￿cation




















































= ￿isijtsilt; if l = 2 g and l 6= j;















































The formulas for the price elasticities follow trivially, and for that reason we
decided to skip their representation.
Random Coe¢ cients Nested Logit Counterfactual The way we com-
pute our counterfactual for the random coe¢ cient (logit) model is alike those
presented in the previous subsections (6.B.1 and 6.B.2), with the additional dif-
￿culty that we now have to deal with simulated individual probabilities. Hence
the markup function relies on the partial derivatives displayed in equation (33).
The underlying logic is however unchanged: Fsolve in Matlab will deliver the
new equilibrium solution to us.
6.C Endogeneity: Simultaneity and Omitted Variable
The identi￿cation of a Least Squares estimator in the case of stochastic explana-
tory variables typically avails of the conditional independence assumption, that
43is, the error term has to be mean zero once conditioned on a set of exogenous
variables. This was condition (22) in our paper.
We now write the following relation:
y = X￿ + ";
and put forward the following conditional independence assumption E ("jX) =
0; but assume that only a subset X1 of the variables in X ￿ [X1;X2] is observed.
The remaining variables X2; are omitted. The unobservability of X2 generates
a violation of the conditional independence assumption E ("jX) = 0, and thus
Least Squares estimated parameters are biased. The issue is that the true model
is,
y = X1￿1 + X2￿2 + ";
but we estimate by Least Squares the model,
y = X1￿1 +e ";
where
e " = X2￿2 + ":










Now, if the true model is correctly speci￿ed, condition E ("jX) = 0 implies


















In this case the bias is generated entirely by the omitted (unobserved) variables
X2. On the other side, if the model su⁄ers of a combination of simultaneity and































Of course summing two sources of bias can generate the following scenarios: A
larger (in absolute value) total bias, if both sources of biases co-move, i.e., have
the same sign, or a smaller (in absolute value) total bias, if the two sources of
bias move in di⁄erent directions (have di⁄erent signs).
44We now de￿ne Z ￿ [Z1;X2] and assume that Z1 is a set of instruments that
solves the simultaneity bias, so that E ("jZ1) = 0. This con￿nes the bias to be
only produced by omitted variables, and to depend on the relation between the
















New Omitted Variables Bias
:
An important by-product of this instrumentation is that, should Z1 and X2 be
uncorrelated, the omitted variables bias would vanish. In other words, it would
be possible to search for ideal instruments that would correct simultaneously
both the simultaneity and omitted variables bias, alternatively one should either
￿nd a good proxy of X2; or look for new data that have X2.
6.D Gradient of the Objective Function Associated to Non-
linear Parameters in the Random Coe¢ cient Nested
Logit Model
If we average the individual probabilities displayed in equation (12) we obtain
























whose components have been de￿ned in equations (13) and (14). We follow
the appendix of Nevo (2000a) and derive the various components that enter the
demand side gradient:





































































































































































































































We recognize that the above partial derivative is the own price partial derivative
displayed in equation (30), but without the additional term (@￿jt=@pjt) = ￿￿.
Hence we can ￿t the partial derivatives in (30) to our case as follows:
1b) The partial derivative of market share with respect to the mean utilities






















1c) The partial derivative of market share with respect to the mean utilities
















We now add the partial derivatives of market shares with respect to the
nonlinear parameters, as follows:
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3) Similarly, the partial derivatives of market share with respect to the two
price parameters have to be taken separately:



















































































































































































































































































































Those above partial derivatives are the main components that one needs to
derive the demand side gradient analytically.
6.E Instruments Selection
Before devoting attention to our choice of instruments, we brie￿ y introduce
our four step procedure. In step one we regress our endogenous variables, over
48di⁄erent sets of instruments, to see which instruments have more power. In
step two, we select the signi￿cant instruments, compute a demand side GMM
and verify whether the instruments have some validity. Step three avails of
the estimated demand primitives from the previous step, deduces estimated
marginal costs, and assesses the power on supply. The ￿nal step checks for the
validity of the instruments for those endogenous variables that directly, or via
functional forms, enter the pricing equation GMM. The idea of this process is
to explore the power and validity of the instruments separately for demand and
supply, as it is likely to be bene￿cial for the choice of instruments in the joint
estimate of demand and supply.
We now detail the process of choosing the instruments. We regress the en-
dogenous variables listed in the ￿rst row of Table 11, individually on each set of
instruments. Instrumentation includes the BLP (z1￿z6) and the Hausman and
Taylor (z7 ￿ z8) instruments. We begin by discussing the power of instruments
on endogenous demand side variables. Column two of Table 11 exhibits possi-
ble instruments for the price variable. The set of instruments displays decent
explanatory power. The F-statistic of 5:65 is signi￿cant. Based on this informa-
tion we suggest z1, z2, z5, and z7 as potential instruments for the endogeneity
of prices. Next, because price is the only endogenous variable in the logit spec-
i￿cation, we can immediately use those instruments to estimate a GMM logit
demand. The results are reported in Table 12. The ￿rst column shows a non
signi￿cant value of the price parameter, and a high value for the Hansen J over-
estimation test (25:18). Seemingly our selected instruments are not too helpful
in identifying the price parameter. Furthermore, the estimation of the price
parameter is not too far o⁄ the OLS biased alternative, and thus it generates
a similar impressive number of deduced negative marginal costs. With this in
mind, we conclude that we have inadequate instruments to estimate a single
demand side in a logit speci￿cation when store coverage is unobserved. How-
ever, we warn that this conclusion only applies to the single equation demand
estimation.
We proceed to add the role of store coverage in the estimation of the logit
speci￿cation. First we attempt to validate the use of the AR proxy. Looking
at column ￿ve of Table 11, we observe that the introduction of the proxy does
not change our choice of best instruments, but presents a slightly lower F-
test. The GMM demand estimation does provide evidence of a slighter minor
improvement in the overidenti￿cation test, but overall the estimated coe¢ cients
and explanatory power are non satisfactory. We move on to use actual store
coverage. Since a priori one cannot exclude this variable from being endogenous,
49we need to separate the case where store coverage is endogenous from the one
that it is exogenous. We begin the process by assuming the variable to be
endogenous, and then test for its endogeneity. Additionally, we must investigate
potential instruments for store coverage, and the options are illustrated in the
￿nal column of Table 11. Clearly z1, will be a crucial instrument to capture
the endogeneity of store coverage, as it is signi￿cant for store coverage and not
for price (the other endogenous variable). Column three of the GMM demand
estimation in Table 12 depicts the estimates when store coverage is treated
as endogenous. The p-value of the Hansen C test at the bottom of the table
suggests that the variable should be treated as exogenous. Hence, we re-estimate
the GMM demand equation, this time assuming store coverage as exogenous
and write down the results in column four. From the table it emerges that the
demand parameter is identi￿ed. The number of deduced negative marginal costs
is now declining, however we still have that the parameter associated to store
coverage is overestimated (exceeds its theoretical bound of one); probably due
to the omittance of a full nested logit structure.
We now turn to the nested logit speci￿cation and start the previous pro-
cedure again with store coverage unobserved. This time we need to add the
within segment market share endogenous variable. Column three in Table 11
unveils z1, z2, z4, and z7 to be powerful in explaining this endogeneity. We
rely on z4 as good instrument to identify the within segment coe¢ cient, as it is
shown to be weakly signi￿cant in explaining the within segment market share
regression, and not signi￿cant in the price estimation. The estimation of the
GMM demand, for which results are detailed in Table 12, indicates signi￿cant
overestimations of the price and within segment market share parameters. This
suggests a potential mispeci￿cation, probably due to the unobservability of store
coverage.
We now convey our attention to the nested logit speci￿cation under the AR
proxy scenario. From Table 11 we witness the strong power of z1, z2, and z7
in explaining the log of within segment market share, so combined with the
aforementioned chosen instruments for the price variable, we end up using z1,
z2, z4, z5, and z7 for the demand side estimation. Its results are documented
in Table 12. We see that the introduction of the AR proxy corrects for the
overestimation of the price (in absolute value) and for within segment market
share parameters, but the low p-value reported in the overidenti￿cation test still
signals a certain weakness of the instrumentation.
Our ￿nal step is to add the observability of store coverage and verify how
that contributes to our demand nested logit estimation. We select the good
50instruments from the regressions printed in the last column of Table 11 and
embed them in the GMM demand estimation. Next, we estimate demand as-
suming store coverage as endogenous. Then, we re-estimate it by imposing
store coverage as exogenous. Based on the value of a Hansen C test we decide
whether or not store coverage is endogenous in this second speci￿cation. The
Hansen C test p-value expressed in column seven of Table 12 tells us that store
coverage should be considered exogenous. Summarizing the other main results
in the table: The GMM demand estimation that uses store coverage produces
better results than the one that avails of the AR proxy. However, the instru-
mentation still presents a low validity of the instruments (as indicated by the
Hansen J test); nevertheless comparing it with the previous speci￿cation, we
see movements in the right direction.
As discussed at the beginning of this section we use the estimated demand
primitives to recover an estimate of the marginal costs. So, we can shift to
stages three and four of our procedure. In stage three we regress the following
endogenous variables: marginal cost for the logit speci￿cation c, marginal cost
for the nested logit speci￿cation nc, and the demand side variables market share
s, and within segment market share sj=g. This step of the procedure helps us in
choosing the powerful instruments that are to be rooted in the GMM ￿supply￿
estimation.
We begin this ￿supply￿side digression by analyzing the estimates of the logit
speci￿cation with unobserved store coverage. Column two of Table 13 shows
that there is only one instrument good at explaining the market share s, and
that is z1. Based on this information we choose z1 as an instrument for the cost
equation, so that the cost side in this case is just identi￿ed. Its IV estimation
is outlined in Table 14 and the results are not too encouraging. This is most
probably a follow-up of the bias in the price parameter of the GMM demand
estimation, as it enters the market power function, and has therefore a direct
impact in our derivation of marginal costs. Next, also for the cost side, we shed
light on the role of the AR proxy. The instrumentation is the same as we have
outlined for logit without store coverage (only one good instrument, which is
z1). As for the GMM ￿supply￿estimation, column two of Table 14 shows the
estimates have not improved from those reported in column one (again, possibly
due to the bias in the demand GMM estimation). The results get better if we
observe store coverage. In this case our pick of instruments leans towards z3, z4,
and z6. The GMM ￿supply￿estimation is now satisfactory. The instruments
pass the validity test and show interesting results. Covering more stores a⁄ects
the marginal cost of production in a signi￿cant way. In addition, the longer the
51period to stock out, the lower the marginal cost of production, therefore this is
a good proxy for transportation cost.
We continue our analysis of stage 3 and 4 using the nested logit. The regres-
sion of the within segment market share is presented in column four of Table
13. The signi￿cant instruments are z1, z4, and z7 and they will all be part of
the GMM ￿supply￿estimation.
Following the method previously set out, we start with the case where store
coverage is unobservable. The GMM estimate shows a good quality of instru-
ments, as indicated by the Hansen J test. The variable months to stock out is
not signi￿cant here, but it carries the right sign. The next step is the familiar
attempt to utilize the AR proxy. In this scenario we pick only two powerful
instruments: z4, and z7. We are again just identi￿ed. The parameters of the
GMM estimation are emboldening. They are of the right sign and signi￿cant.
Again, ￿nally we account for the true store coverage. In this event the choice of
the instruments points to z3, z4, z6. The results of the GMM are encouraging,
both in the sign and signi￿cance of the relevant parameters in terms of months
to stock out and store coverage.T
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